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Abstract
THE COSTS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM:
EVIDENCE FROM A SEQUENTIAL DECISION MODEL
Nickolay M. Gantchev
Lucian Taylor
Recent work on hedge fund activism documents substantial abnormal returns but fails to
answer the question whether these returns cover the large costs of activist campaigns. This
paper provides benchmarks for monitoring costs and evaluates the net returns to activism.
I model activism as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board
representation and proxy contest and estimate the costs of each distinct stage. A campaign
ending in a proxy ght has average costs of $10.71 million. The proxy contest is the most
expensive stage, followed by demand negotiations. The estimated monitoring costs consume
more than two-thirds of gross activist returns implying that the net returns to activism are
signicantly lower than previously thought. Even though the mean net return is close to
zero, the top quartile of activists earn higher returns on their activist holdings than on their
non-activist investments.
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The Costs of Shareholder Activism:
Evidence froma Sequential DecisionModel
0.1 Introduction
Does activist investing generate positive net returns for the activist? Answering this question
will help us evaluate the potential for activism to mitigate agency costs resulting from the sep-
aration of ownership and control. Activist shareholders occupy an important middle ground
between internal governance by blockholders and board of directors and external governance
by the market for corporate control. As a result, the presence of an activist shareholder can
be crucial for the proper functioning of a rms corporate governance system.
A shareholders incentives to actively monitor are determined by a trade-o¤ between the
private costs of monitoring, which are fully internalized by the activist, and the public benets
of monitoring, which are shared among all rm shareholders (Grossman and Hart (1980),
Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). In order to understand this incentive trade-o¤, we need to assess
both the benets and the costs of active monitoring.
Recent work on hedge fund activism has documented that activists generate signicant
abnormal returns both in absolute terms and in comparison to non-activist investing. Brav
et al. (2008) report that the average hedge fund activist in 2001-2006 earned 14.30% higher
return than the size-adjusted value weighted portfolio of stocks. Cli¤ord (2008) demonstrates
that activist hedge funds in 1998-2005 generated 21.75% higher annualized returns that the
passive holdings of the same managers.
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Do these substantial returns cover the large costs of activist engagements? These costs
consist of disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy advisors and solicitors, corporate
governance experts, investment banks, public relations and advertising rms in addition to
unobservable costs such as the time and e¤ort of the activist to negotiate with a target. The
existing literature on shareholder activism lacks a proper measure for these costs and does
not take them into account in the estimation of activist returns. This leads to an incomplete
assessment of the activists incentive trade-o¤.
Most evidence about monitoring costs is anecdotal and limited to proxy solicitations - the
most public activist approach. Stephen M. Bainbridge estimates the costs of a proxy contest
at $1.8 million based on a survey conducted in the late 1980s (see Thomas et al. (1998)) but
points out that costs almost certainly are much higher today. Hedge fund activists estimate
proxy costs at "upwards of $10,000,000.1 However, the majority of activist campaigns do
not reach a proxy contest but rely on less confrontational activist approaches such as informal
demand negotiations and board representation, whose costs are unobservable and cannot be
estimated from public data.
This paper complements recent work on hedge fund activism by providing cost benchmarks
for evaluating the net returns to activism. In order to account for the large heterogeneity of
activist events, I estimate the costs associated with three common activist approaches - demand
negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. I nd that the average campaign ending
in a proxy ght costs $10.71 million. Subtracting costs reduces the mean abnormal activist
return by two-thirds suggesting that costs play a major role in the activists decision-making
1See Stephen M. Bainbridge (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/bainbridge121903.htm);
Ralph V. Whitworth (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf); and Carl Icahn
(http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/were-not-the-boss-of-aig/).
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behavior.
The approach taken in this paper consists of two interrelated parts. First, I model activism
as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation and
proxy contest, and dene the activists break-even constraint for monitoring. Then, I transform
this break-even condition into a discrete-choice framework and estimate the costs of activism
implied by the observed decision-making behavior of activists between 2000 and 2007.
The starting point of this paper is a novel denition of activism as a sequence of escalating
decision steps, in which an activist chooses a more hostile tactic only after less confrontational
approaches have failed. A typical campaign starts with an announcement of activist intentions
(usually reported in a regulatory ling), followed by communication of specic demands to
the target. Initial negotiations between the activist and the target are rarely successful. The
activist may choose to terminate his campaign after failed negotiations, or pursue a more
direct approach by requesting a board seat. In most instances, the activist is denied board
representation, in which case he has the option to solicit input from other shareholders, and
eventually wage a proxy ght.
The activists decision problem involves a basic trade-o¤ between the expected benet from
campaign continuation with a specic approach and the expected cost of activist involvement.
This decision can be described by the activists break-even prot constraint for monitoring
and consists of two steps. First, the activist estimates a net continuation benet by comparing
his expected reward from the campaign to the cost of intervening with a particular tactic.
Then, he compares this net benet to the selling value of his ownership stake. The observed
continuation decision denes a minimum cost threshold at which the activist is indi¤erent
between continuation and exit.
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The activists break-even condition is transformed into a discrete-choice problem under the
assumptions of random utility theory. The activists decision is summarized by the expected
gross return in a successful campaign, which relies on an estimate of its benet, and the ac-
tivists marked-to-market investment in the target, which captures the opportunity cost of the
campaign. The expected reward in a successful intervention equals a targets potential value if
the activists demands are successfully implemented. Empirically, I estimate a targets poten-
tial value as the valuation of a matched peer with similar fundamentals. This valuation metric
reects the potential for value improvement due to an activist engagement and is calibrated
to the actual valuation improvement in successful activist campaigns.
The estimation procedure consists of two simultaneous parts - a system of conditional
logistic regressions, which separately derives the costs of each activist stage, and statistical
backward induction, which uses the estimated costs of later stages in the calculation of the
costs of the earlier stages of activism. I solve the underidentication problem of the logistic
model by using an exogenous identication restriction derived from the activists break-even
prot constraint. This identifying restriction xes the scale of utility of each stage allowing me
to derive the absolute magnitude of stage costs.
The main contribution of this paper is providing cost benchmarks to assess the net returns
to activism. I estimate the costs of three common activist approaches - demand negotiations,
board representation and proxy contest. The proxy contest stage has the highest cost equal to
$5.94 million for the average activist campaign. The demand negotiations stage is the second
most expensive stage of the activist process, with average costs of $2.94 million. The least
expensive tactic is board representation, which adds $1.83 million to the cost of the average
campaign. These estimates represent a rst attempt in the literature to quantify the costs of
4
these common activist approaches.
I calculate net abnormal activist returns in excess of the value-weighted portfolio of stocks
(VW returns) and in excess of characteristic portfolios based on size, market-to-book and stock
return momentum (DGTW returns).2 The mean annualized VW abnormal return is 4.02%
while the mean DGTW abnormal return is 7.61%. Costs consume more than two-thirds of
gross activist returns. The mean VW abnormal return drops to 0.23% while the mean DGTW
abnormal return becomes 2.38% after subtracting costs. Even though the mean net return is
close to zero, the top quartile of activists earn higher returns on their activist holdings than
on their non-activist portfolios.
This paper introduces a large hand-collected dataset of hedge fund activist campaigns be-
tween 2000 and 2007, which contains detailed information about the evolution of each campaign
and the negotiation tactics employed by activists. The nal sample consists of 1164 unique
campaigns summarized in 5645 individual lings by 171 hedge funds and 1023 unique targets.
In addition to data from regulatory lings, the sample includes activist events reported in the
press as described in Brav et al. (2008).3
The comprehensive dataset used in this paper provides new large-sample evidence, which
aids in understanding the nature and evolution of activist engagements. I document that more
than two-thirds of activists quit before making formal demands to their targets. From the
sample of activists who announce specic demands, less than 20 percent proceed to request
a board seat and only 10-12% threaten a proxy contest. Surprisingly, only 7% of activist
2The calculation of characteristic based returns follows the approach in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and
Wermers (1997).
3Schedule 13D and proxy statements are the main data sources in this study. Schedule 13D is led by any
investor who acquires more than 5% of the voting stock of a public company with the intention of inuencing
its operations or management. See Appendix A for a detailed description of this ling.
5
campaigns end up in a proxy ght.
Activists are most successful when demanding a sale (or privatization) of a target, restruc-
turing of ine¢ cient operations and additional disclosure but less successful when asking for
higher dividends (or repurchases), CEO removal or executive compensation changes. In terms
of their demands, 29.17% of activists achieve their objectives. As an alternative measure of
success, I estimate holding period returns and show that only the highest quartile of activist
campaigns earn positive returns.
I also document that more confrontational activist tactics have higher success rates. The
most successful activist stage is the proxy contest, in which 57.38% of activists achieve their
objectives. Board representation is e¤ective in 39.33% of the cases while demand negotiations
are successful in only 6.76% of the campaigns. Even though proxy contests are successful in
the majority of activist events, only 7% of campaigns reach the proxy stage suggesting that the
high costs of proxy solicitations deter some activists from pursuing their investment objectives.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related academic liter-
ature. Section 3 presents a new denition of activism as a sequential decision process and
denes the activists break-even prot constraint. Section 4 discusses the empirical design,
identication and estimation of target valuations. Section 5 describes the activist sample.
Section 6 reports the main empirical results and Section 7 presents robustness analysis.
Section 8 concludes.
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0.2 Literature Review
One of the classic questions in nance is whether shareholders have adequate incentives to
e¤ectively monitor rm management. Active monitoring aligns the interests of managers and
shareholders, and reduces the agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and
control. Shareholder activists - minority shareholders intent on changing major rm policies
- have often acted as the interface between internal governance by blockholders and board of
directors and external governance by the market for corporate control.
The theoretical literature has studied the importance of monitoring costs (in terms of
liquidity, risk aversion, or information acquisition) in determining the activists incentive trade-
o¤. Grossman and Hart (1980) were the rst to point out that small shareholders may lack the
proper incentives to discipline managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) consider the role of large
shareholders (blockholders) in providing e¤ective governance. They argue that a blockholder
will actively monitor as long as the return on his stake is su¢ cient to cover the costs of
monitoring.
Admati, Peiderer and Zechner (1994) consider a blockholders trade-o¤ in terms of the
loss in risk-sharing benets resulting from concentrated ownership. They show that market
ine¢ ciencies (e.g., free-riding) may induce a blockholder to reduce his ownership rather than
incur the cost of monitoring. Kahn and Winton (1998) demonstrate that the precision of a
blockholders private information increases his motive to speculate in the targets shares rather
than intervene to improve performance. Maug (1998) studies the e¤ects of market liquidity on
a shareholders incentives to monitor and shows that liquid markets help shareholders overcome
the free-rider problem.
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More recently, Edmans and Manso (2011) argue that a multiple blockholder structure
exacerbates the free-rider problem and reduces the e¤ectiveness of direct intervention (voice)
but increases the usefulness of governance through trading (exit). Cohn and Rajan (2011)
consider the interplay between internal and external governance in a model, in which the
activist incurs a xed cost as a function of his information about the rm.
Despite the theoretical emphasis on monitoring costs, the empirical literature has largely
ignored costs in analyzing the activists incentive trade-o¤. This most likely results from
challenges in measuring the costs of activism.
The rst challenge has been nding the right institutional setting to study the trade-o¤
facing an activist shareholder. Most empirical work has focused on pension or mutual funds
and labor unions even though their monitoring abilities are severely limited by regulatory (or
self-imposed) restrictions. For example, pension and mutual funds are subject to the prudent
man rule which curbs investment in some troubled companies while mutual funds have to
comply by diversication requirements that limit their ability to accumulate a concentrated
position in a target. In addition, pension and mutual funds may be unwilling to become
confrontational with rms whose business they covet while unions may pursue self-interested
agendas conicting with shareholder maximization.
Consequently, most recent surveys of shareholder activism (Karpo¤(2001), Romano (2001),
Gillan and Starks (2007), Holderness (2003), Yermack (2010)) have concluded that institutional
activism (by pension funds, mutual funds and unions) has had limited impact on rm gover-
nance and performance. Kahan and Rock (2006) di¤erentiate hedge funds from other activists.
They argue that hedge funds su¤er from fewer conicts of interest, face fewer regulatory re-
strictions, and have a better-aligned incentive structure, which makes them better positioned
8
as active monitors.4
The second challenge in measuring the costs of activism has been the lack of empirical
data. Most evidence about monitoring costs is limited and anecdotal, and pertains to contested
proxy solicitations. For example, Stephen M. Bainbridge estimates the costs of a proxy contest
at $1.8 million based on data from the late 1980s while statements by hedge fund managers
suggest that proxy costs exceed $10 million.5 However, the costs of less confrontational activist
campaigns are unobservable and cannot be estimated from publicly-available information.
This paper is the rst attempt in the literature to quantify the costs of monitoring. It
complements recent work on hedge fund activism by providing cost benchmarks to evaluate
the net returns to activism. For example, Brav et al. (2008) report that the average hedge
fund activist in their sample between 2001-2006 earned 14.30% higher return than the size-
adjusted value-weighted portfolio of stocks. Klein and Zur (2009) compare the hostile activist
campaigns of hedge funds to those of other activists, and nd that hedge funds earn higher
overall returns. Cli¤ord (2008) demonstrates that activist investing is a protable investment
strategy even when compared to non-activist investing.
The existing literature on shareholder activism does not account for the costs of activist
monitoring due to the lack of proper measures for these costs. This leads to an incomplete
assessment of the activists incentive trade-o¤. This paper estimates that costs consume about
two-thirds of gross activist returns implying that the net returns to activism are signicantly
lower than previously thought.
4Hedge funds have initiated the large majority of activist campaigns since 2000.
5See references above.
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0.3 Model Framework
0.3.1 Activism as a Sequential Process
Gillan and Starks (2007) dene shareholder activists as investors who, dissatised with some
aspect of a companys management or operations, try to bring about change within the com-
pany without a change in control.(p. 55) Tirole (2006) provides the following denition:
Active monitoring consists in interfering with management in order to increase the value of
the investors claims.(p. 27) Both denitions comprise a continuum of possible responses
to corporate performance and activities but do not consider activism as a decision process
consisting of a sequential set of tactics.
Contrast these broad denitions to the way in which activists describe the monitoring
process as a sequence of escalating decision steps.6 Appaloosa Management writes to Beverly
Enterprises: Although we continue to prefer pursuing a negotiated transaction with the Com-
pany, your actions have left us no choice but to nominate a slate of directors for election at
your upcoming annual meeting. [...] Our nominees, if elected, will, subject to their duciary
duties, be committed to going forward with a process that would give due consideration to our
o¤er as well as any other proposals the Company may receive.7
Another example comes from a letter by Seymour Holtzman of Jewelcor Management to the
Chairman of Thistle Group, My reason for proposing a slate of Directors is for the purpose of
hiring an investment banker to seek out an attractive merger partner who would be willing to
pay a signicant premium for our stock. [...] Moreover, if you were to assure the shareholders
6See also Appendix B describing Carl Icahns campaign at Time Warner Inc.
7Full letter available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006438/000089534505000135/exhi99_10.txt.
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of your willingness to do this, I would give serious consideration to withdrawing my proposed
slate of Directors. I know that you and your family are larger shareholders and I hope you will
act in the best interest of all of the shareholders, so the Company will not have to waste time
and money in a proxy contest.8
The above anecdotal statements underscore two common patterns in the data. First,
activists consider a range of tactics in their discussions with a target - demand negotiations,
board representation, and proxy threat/ght. Second, these tactics form an escalating sequence
from less hostile to more confrontational. An activist chooses a more hostile tactic only after
less confrontational approaches have failed to produce results.
A typical campaign starts with the announcement of activist intentions, usually reported
in Schedule 13D. This regulatory form (also know as a benecial ownership report) needs to
be led with the SEC by anyone who acquires more than 5% of the voting stock of a public
company with the intention of inuencing its operations or management.9 The majority of
initial 13D lers terminate their campaigns without announcing demands. These hedge funds
may have led Schedule 13D for legal reasons or in anticipation of an activist engagement but
decided against it. This sample of activists is instrumental in estimating the costs of the rst
stage of the activist process.
Insert Figure 1
Shortly after the initial ling of Schedule 13D, the activist formally communicates a set of
8Full letter available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056590/000105659002000009/exhibitc.txt.
9 In addition to data from regulatory lings, the sample includes non-public activist campaigns (i.e. events
below the ling threshold of 5%) reported in the press as described in Brav et al. (2008).
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specic demands (such as a sale of the company, restructuring of ine¢ cient operations, addi-
tional share repurchases, etc.) to the management of the target. The formal announcement
of activist demands marks the beginning of the rst stage of the activist process - demand
negotiations. This rst stage is rarely successful despite its high costs in terms of the activists
time and e¤ort. Upon failure of initial demand negotiations, the activist may choose to termi-
nate the campaign, or request board representation, which allows for a more direct interaction
with the targets management. This second stage of the activist process starts with an o¢ cial
request for board representation, most often accomplished by a nomination notice, a share-
holder proposal, or a publicly led letter. Board representation has a higher success rate than
demand negotiations but increases the overall costs of a campaign. As a result, only one-fth
of initial 13D lers request a board seat.
If the activist does not obtain board representation, he may start soliciting input from other
shareholders by ling a preliminary proxy statement (stage 3), and eventually wage a proxy
ght (stage 4). The proxy contest stage has the highest success rate in terms of implementing
the activists demands but is also the most costly. As a result, less than one-tenth of the
original 13D lers initiate proxy contests.
Dened in this way, the activist process evolves from private to more public forms of engage-
ment. There is some anecdotal evidence describing the legal and disclosure costs of the proxy
contest stage. However, most of the costs of the demand negotiations and board representation
stages are unobservable and cannot be estimated from publicly-available information.
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0.3.2 The Activists Decision Problem
Ralph V. Whitworth of Relational Investors describes their decision whether to initiate a proxy
contest as follows: Although the credible ability to initiate a proxy contest under the existing
rules has been e¤ective for Relational in many cases, in others, costs and procedural burdens
resulted in our electing not to use the process even though we were convinced that improved
board composition would create value for all shareholders. In the latter set of cases, the
projects are often abandoned or not taken in the rst instance.10
The above statement describes the decision problem of an activist as a basic trade-o¤
between the expected benet from an activist intervention (with a specic tactic) and the
expected cost of the engagement. The activists choice set - denoted below by n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g
- corresponds to commonly observed activist tactics as described in the sequential denition
of activism. Specically, 0 = activist intentions but no specic demands, 1 = demand nego-
tiations, 2 = board representation, 3 = (threatened) proxy contest. The activist selects more
confrontational tactics only if less hostile approaches fail to convince the target to implement
the proposed demands. Intuitively, more aggressive tactics have a higher probability of success
but increase the overall cost of a campaign.
The activists break-even prot constraint for monitoring compares the expected benet
from campaign continuation against its costs. The expected benet in a successful campaign
is based on an estimate of the targets maximum potential value, which equals its valuation
if the activists demands are successfully executed. This continuation value corresponds to
the di¤erence between the targets fundamental value, Vi, and its current market price, Mi,
10Letter of from Ralph V. Whitworth, Principal, Relational Investors LLC to the SEC, Aug. 14, 2009
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf).
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and is a su¢ cient statistic for the protability of the campaign. In the empirical analysis, the
continuation benet is measured by the valuation gap between the target rm and its matched
peers, and is robust to a variety of denitions and estimation procedures.
The costs of an activist campaign include disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy
advisors and solicitors, corporate governance experts, investment banks, public relations and
advertising rms in addition to unobservable costs such as the time and e¤ort of the activist.
This study assumes that costs vary with the choice of tactic but are independent of campaign
characteristics, i.e. the costs of each stage are xed across activists. The empirical analysis
relaxes this assumption by including activist xed e¤ects such as experience, preference for
confrontation and busynessin the estimation of costs.
The activists decision involves two steps. First, he estimates a net continuation benet by
comparing his expected return from campaign continuation to the cost of intervening with a
particular tactic. Then, he compares this net benet to the selling value of his ownership stake.
A binding break-even prot constraint denes a minimum cost threshold associated with the
stage, at which the activist terminates the campaign. Using the exit decisions of activists in
the sample period, I am able to derive a sequence of (minimum) cost thresholds implied by
the observed decision-making behavior.
Consider the activists decision at stage n. Upon failure of this stage, he has to decide
whether to sell at the current market price, Min, or continue with a more confrontational
tactic (n + 1), which has a higher probability of success but will increase the cost of the
campaign. At stage (n+1), the activist eliminates the targets discount with some probability,
pi;n+1, or fails with a complementary probability. In the latter case, he is faced with a similar
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choice between continuation and exit.11
The activists problem can be summarized by the expected utility of each alternative. The
activist compares his utility from continuation, U conti;n , to the utility of selling at the current
price, U exiti;n :
U conti;n =  cn + pi;n+1E (i;n+1Vi;n+1) + (1  pi;n+1)E

max

i;n+1Mi;n+1; U
cont
i;n+1
	
(1)
U exiti;n = inMin
Here, in denotes the current activist ownership, and cn is the cost of stage n.12 U conti;n+1
is the utility from continuation to the next stage, if applicable. The activists break-even
constraint can be written as:
U conti;n = U
exit
i;n <=>
~Ui;n = U
cont
i;n   U exiti;n = 0 (2)
For example, consider the activists choice at the last decision stage - the decision node
before the proxy contest stage. The activist compares the utility from the two available al-
ternatives - continue to a proxy ght, U conti;3 , or sell at the current market price, U
exit
i3 , as
follows:
U conti3 =  c3 + pi3iVi3 + (1  pi3)iMi3 (3)
U exiti3 = iMi2
11The model assumes that each stage of the activist process has a xed duration, which allows me to replace
the time subscript t with the stage subscript n in the rest of this section. See the empirical analysis for evidence
supporting this assumption.
12The empirical evidence in Section 5 supports the modelling assumption that the activist would not use
ownership strategically to exert more pressure on the target. Hence, I drop the stage subscript for .
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The activist continues to the proxy stage if
~Ui3 =  c3 + pi3iVi + (1  pi3)iMi   iMi  0 (4)
~Ui3 =

  c3
pi3

1
iMi

+

Vi
Mi

  1  0
The above transformation summarizes the activists decision by two explanatory variables
- the expected gross return from a successful campaign,

Vi
Mi

(continuation decision), and
the current value of the investment in the target,

1
iMi

(exit decision). The transformation
assumes that the activists best estimate of his continuation reward equals the targets current
gap from potential rm value, i.e. the activist does not time the market. This assumption is
reasonable if we believe that any attempt by the activist to manipulate the markets perception
of his success will result in an immediate negative correction of the targets price to its current
value, Mi. This reasoning is supported by ndings in Brav et al. (2008) who show that the
market reacts very negatively to hedge fund exits in failed campaigns resulting in negative
abnormal returns of -4% in the (-20, +20) window of exit.
More generally, the activists stage-specic break-even constraint is
~Uin = n

1
iMi

+

Vi
Mi

  1 = 0 (5)
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where
3 =  
c3
pi3
(6)
2 = max
 c2   (1  pi2)c3
pi2 + pi3   pi2pi3 ;
 c2
pi2

1 = max
  c1   (1  pi1)c2   (1  pi1)(1  pi2)c3
pi1 + pi2 + pi3   pi1pi2   pi1pi3   pi2pi3 + pi1pi2pi3 ;
 c1   (1  pi1)c2
pi1 + pi2   pi1pi2 ;
 c1
pi1

The next section converts the activists stage-specic break-even condition into a discrete-
choice model by adding an error structure, which captures the econometricians imperfect
knowledge of the utility from each decision alternative. This allows estimation of activist costs
without imposing additional assumptions about the parameter distributions.
0.4 Econometric Design
0.4.1 Random Utility Specication
The activists break-even constraint for monitoring can be rewritten into a regression framework
under the general assumptions of random utility theory. This step transforms the activists
decision into a discrete-choice problem, in which his choice between continuation and exit at
each stage is summarized by the utility of each alternative.13
The activist knows the utility of campaign continuation (denoted by Uin) as well as the
utility of exit (Uin0). The econometrician estimates the activists representative utility, Uin
and Uin0 respectively, based on some observable characteristics of each alternative such as the
13See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Train (2003) for surveys of the literature on discrete-choice models.
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expected gross return of a successful campaign and the present value of the investment in
the target. These estimates di¤er from the activists actual utility by an error term, which
captures unobservable factors that vary among activists with the same representative utility
such as preference for (or experience with) a specic tactic.
Uin = Uin + "in (7)
Uin0 = Uin0 + "in0
Assuming an exogenous sample of activists whose decisions are independent, we write the
probability of activist i choosing alternative n as the following expression:
Pr fUin > Uin0g = Pr fUin + "in > Uin0 + "in0g = Pr f"in0   "in < Uin   Uin0g (8)
=
Z
"
I f"in0 < "in + Uin   Uin0g f(")d"
where I is an indicator function equal to one when the expression in the parentheses is
correct.
Assuming iid type I extreme value errors results in the logit formulation, which simplies
the above expression further.
Pr fUin > Uin0 j"ingi 6=j =
Y
i 6=j
exp(  exp(  ("in + Uin   Uin0))) (9)
Pr fUin > Uin0gi 6=j =
Z 0@Y
i 6=j
exp(  exp(  ("in + Uin   Uin0)))
1A exp( "in) exp(  exp( "in))d"in
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Using the fact that the di¤erence between two extreme values is distributed logistically, the
above expression takes the following closed form for a binary choice:
Pr fUin > Uin0g =
exp(Uin)
1 + exp(Uin)
(10)
We derive the standard logistic regression model assuming a linear probability specication:
Pr fUin > Uin0g =
exp(x0)
1 + exp(x0)
(11)
Pr

Uin > U

in0
	
Pr

Uin  Uin0
	 = exp(x0)
log
 
Pr

Uin > U

in0
	
Pr

Uin  Uin0
	! = x0
As a result, the activists stage-specic break-even constraint can be rewritten into a re-
gression equation, which takes an analogous form for each stage:
log

continue
exit

= ^1

1
inMin

+ ^2

Vin
Min

(12)
Activist costs are estimated using the above regression equation for each stage of activism.
The rst coe¢ cient in each regression estimates relative stage costs. The second coe¢ cient
identies a stage-specic scale parameter, which is required to nd the absolute magnitude of
each cost threshold (as described next).
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0.4.2 Identication
Monitoring costs are estimated using the activists break-even prot condition (as dened
in equation 12). The empirical procedure consists of two simultaneous parts - a system of
conditional logistic regressions, which separately derives the costs of each stage, and statistical
backward induction, which uses the estimated costs of later stages in the calculation of the
costs of the earlier stages of activism.14 That is, the activists decision problem is estimated
equation by equation following a recursive system of substitutions.
Each stage logistic regression uses the conditional sample of activists who have reached the
current decision step and are choosing whether to continue to the next stage.15 The starting
point of the estimation is the last decision stage, where the activist chooses whether to initiate
a proxy contest.16 The activists break-even prot constraint (Equation 4) denes a minimum
cost threshold associated with the continuation to a proxy. Then, the estimated costs of the
proxy stage are used as inputs in the calculation of the costs of board representation and
demand negotiations.
A signicant advantage of the chosen empirical design versus other structural methods is
that costs can be estimated without imposing any additional assumptions on the parameter
distributions. The rst coe¢ cient estimate, ^1n, in each logistic regression determines (up to
scale) stage-specic costs. ^1n can be given the following general interpretation:
^1n = ^n =
stage cost function
stage continuation probability
(13)
14See Bas, Signorino and Walker (2008) for a discussion of statistical backward induction.
15This technique is qualitatively similar to using a sequential response model, a limiting case of the nested
logit model, in which the probability of making a transition from stage n of the activist process to stage n+ 1
is conditional on having reached n.
16The estimation sample includes only failed activist campaigns, i.e. campaigns in which the activist faces
the decision whether to continue or exit at a specic stage in the process.
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The rst regression coe¢ cient determines relative stage costs but does not identify the
absolute magnitudes of these costs. This is due to the underidentication of the logistic re-
gression model. In brief, estimation of the logistic model requires imposing a restriction on the
variance of the random error term. Typically, it is assumed that the random utility component
is distributed type I extreme value with variance 2 = 2=6. This is equivalent to normalizing
the scale of utility, or scaling each regression coe¢ cient by 1= (see Train 2003). Most empiri-
cal studies using logistic estimation are interested in the relative magnitudes of the regression
coe¢ cients and are not a¤ected by this underidentication problem.
However, we cannot determine the net returns to activism without knowing the absolute
magnitudes of monitoring costs. Absolute costs can be estimated by using an exogenous
identication restriction derived from the activists break-even prot constraint:
"in =
1
^2n
(14)
This identifying restriction xes the scale of utility of each stage and provides an additional
degree of freedom to pin down the magnitude of stage costs. The stage-specic scale parameters
control for unobserved heterogeneity in the activist sample and lead to more precise cost
estimates. Intuitively, we expect the scale parameters to become smaller with every consecutive
stage because the activists employing more confrontational tactics are more homogeneous. The
results in Table 7 conrm that the proxy contest has the lowest scale parameter while the
negotiations stage has the highest scale parameter.
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0.4.3 Target Valuation and Campaign Return
The activists choice between campaign continuation and exit is described by two explanatory
variables - the expected gross return from a successful intervention,

Vi
Mi

, and the current
value of the activists investment in the target rm,

1
iMi

. A crucial step of the empirical
design is nding Vi - a targets maximum (or frontier) valuation. The modelling setup in this
paper assumes that a target will achieve its maximum potential value if the activists demands
are successfully implemented.
The maximum potential value of a rm is unobservable and has to be estimated. The right
measure needs to reect the potential for value improvement due to an activist intervention.
Generally, a rms valuation may diverge from its fundamental value due to both operational
ine¢ ciencies (such as an outdated plant) and agency issues (for example, poor management).
Both of these problems can be alleviated by e¤ective active monitoring.
Valuation metrics based on a targets current market value are inappropriate because they
may be confounded by market expectations and/or fail to fully reect the potential value
improvement from activism. Using market price reactions as a measure of activist reward will
generally underestimate the expected benets from successful activism (see Brav et al. (2008)
for a discussion). Consequently, I estimate a targets maximum value as the valuation of a
matched peer with similar fundamentals. To produce a valid measure of a targets valuation
improvement due to activism, the chosen valuation metric needs to satisfy three important
conditions.
First, any suitable estimate of frontiervalue needs to measure a targets fundamental valu-
ation along dimensions, which are independent of the activist intervention. This prescribes the
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use of rm-level characteristics, which are likely to remain una¤ected by the activists demands.
Following Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2011), I match targets to other CRSP/Compustat
rms based on size (dened as the log of sales), asset turnover (sales over total assets), market
share (sales divided by total industry sales), growth (average sales growth during the past two
years), and R&D ratio (R&D expense divided by sales).
Second, the estimation of maximum value needs to allow for noisedue to luck, misvaluation
or idiosyncratic factors. In the presence of noise, a target and its matched peer(s) are unlikely
to achieve identical market valuations even if an activist successfully corrects the formers
operational and agency problems. Consequently, the calculation of maximum value assumes
that an activist can improve a targets valuation to that of the best performing peer company
in the same value tercile as the target. This conservative approach limits a targets potential
value improvement and biases the estimated costs of activism downward.
Third, the denition of maximum value needs to properly reect the potential for value
improvement when a campaign is successful. This is achieved by calibrating expected rewards
to the actual valuation improvement in successful activist campaigns. Specically, a parame-
ter in the censored quantile regression used to estimate frontier values is set to equal the
median value improvement achieved by successful activists (calculated at 35.38%).17 Table 10
compares expected activist rewards between successful and failed campaigns and demonstrates
that the di¤erence in average rewards between the two samples is not statistically signicant at
conventional levels. This evidence conrms that the chosen valuation metric accurately reects
the potential for value improvement from a successful campaign.
The estimation of frontier values starts by dividing all CRSP/Compustat rms in a given
17See Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2011) for a discussion of the role of this parameter.
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year into terciles based on sales, asset turnover, market share, growth and R&D ratio. Then,
I calculate a targets maximum potential value by using a censored quantile regression of the
targets Q ratio on the tercile ranks of each of the ve characteristics.18 A rms Q ratio is
dened as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment
credit divided by total assets (as in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)).19 The Q ratio is a
suitable measure for the activists reward from a successful campaign because it reects both the
probability of being targeted and the potential for improvement in undervalued companies.20
In an alternative specication, I use a targets industry a¢ liation as the only determinant of
its frontiervalue. This approach borrows from the takeover literature, which frequently uses
industry analysis to evaluate potential takeover targets (known as the comparable company
method). I assume that an activist can improve a targets value to that of the best performing
industry peer in the same value tercile as the target.
In particular, I divide all CRSP/Compustat rms in the sample period into terciles based
on their Q ratios. Then, I assume that a targets maximum potential value equals the value of
the best performing 3-digit SIC industry peer within the same value tercile. Both explanatory
variables retain their statistical and economic signicance under this alternative specication
(as reported in Table 9).
18The censored least absolute deviations estimator of Powell (1984) is a variation of the original approach of
Koenker and Bassett (1984) and is robust to heteroskedasticity.
19The estimation of maximum value is robust to alternative Q denitions such as the one in Hennessy, Levy
and Whited (2007) who dene Q as total assets plus market equity less book equity less balance sheet deferred
taxes divided by total assets.
20Brav et al. (2009) demonstrate that a one standard deviation decrease in Q is associated with a 0.49 per-
centage point increase in the probability of being targeted, other things being equal... The marginal probabilities
are substantial.(p. 1754)
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0.5 Campaign Data
0.5.1 Sample Construction
I use data from SEC Schedule 13D, preliminary and denitive proxy statements, and SharkRe-
pellent.net to construct a comprehensive dataset of hedge fund activist campaigns between
2000 and 2007. My focus is on the negotiation tactics used during each campaign. I also
collect information about the activists investment intent and demands, the specics of his
communication with the target, the rms response and the outcome of each demand.
Schedule 13D needs to be led by any person or group that acquires more than 5% of the
voting stock of a public company with the intention of inuencing its operations or manage-
ment. More importantly, the SEC requires an amended ling within 10 days of any material
change in the amount or intent of ownership, which allows me to track the evolution of each
campaign through the stages of activism. Appendix A provides a detailed description of SEC
Schedule 13D.
A major challenge in the data collection is consistently identifying activist hedge funds. I
follow a four-step procedure. First, I start with a list of important 13D lings reported by
Dow Jones Newswires in the period between 2000 and 2007. The list contains approximately
5000 lings but about 15% of them were not by hedge funds. The next step is to verify the
identity of the lers. I use at least two of the following sources: FT.coms 100 Hedge Funds
to Watch (April 27, 2007), Institutional Investors Alpha Magazine Hedge Fund 100 (2002-
2008), Infovest21s 714 Hedge Fund Managers Register (Feb. 1, 2006), and a list of hedge fund
activists provided by Robin Greenwood. I supplement the sample by searching Factiva for the
following text strings: ler name and hedge fund, ler name and 13D, ler name and
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activism. I also use Internet searches for web sites and articles about the 13D lers. This
step yields approximately 200 hedge funds and managers, which I group into 129 hedge fund
families.
Then, I download from SEC.gov all 13D lings and their amendments for the nal list of
hedge funds. I collect the following data points - the ling and event dates; the identity and
CIK number of the fund; whether the activist les a 13F report with the SEC; the identity,
CIK number, CUSIP and SIC code of the target; the percentage owned by the activist; the
formal list of demands; the targets reaction and the outcome of each demand.
Item 4 of Schedule 13D provides detailed information about the purpose of each transaction.
This section requires disclosure of any specic plans or proposals with respect to the company
such as an acquisition, a reorganization, a change in capital structure, dividend policy, board
of directors, bylaws, etc. I group activist demands in ve categories - corporate governance,
strategic alternatives, corporate structure, opposition to a proposed transaction and general
undervaluation. Activists who choose the last category without making subsequent demands
could be considered passive investors.
In the last step, I supplement the sample with data from two additional sources. It is
common for an activist to threaten a proxy ght without actually ling proxy materials with
the SEC. For example, an activist may le a so-called preliminary proxy statement soliciting
materials from shareholders as a scare tacticto induce cooperation by the target. In order
to di¤erentiate between a proxy threat and a proxy ght, I collect all preliminary (PREC 14A
and PREN 14A) and denitive (DFAN 14A and DEFN 14A) proxy lings from SEC.gov. I also
use additional outcome data from SharkRepellent.net for the campaigns whose nal outcome
is not reported in their Schedule 13D.
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To account for activist engagements with no Schedule 13D lings (i.e., events below the 5%
ling threshold), I incorporate the non-public activist campaigns used in Brav et al. (2008).
Data on these campaigns were collected through news searches . . . plus a general search using
various combinations of hedge fundand activismas key words. (p. 1738) Of the 25 events,
one was already included in the original sample, two had insu¢ cient press coverage and one
involved preferred shares and non-activist intentions.
For the remaining 21 campaigns, I performed Factiva searches in order to collect informa-
tion necessary to t these events in the sequential denition of activism - tactics and their
announcement dates, demands and outcomes. Of the 21 events, 9 exited after demand nego-
tiations (3 successes), 4 exited after board representation (all successful), and 8 after proxy
contest (3 successes).21 The inclusion of these non-public activist events does not a¤ect the
cost estimates reported in this paper.
After excluding REITS (SIC 6798), bankrupt companies, blank check entities (SIC 6770),
trusts (6792), ADRs, and left-censored observations (events whose start is before 2000), my
nal sample consists of 1164 unique campaigns summarized in 5645 individual lings involving
171 hedge funds and 1023 unique targets.
0.5.2 Summary of Activist Events
Dening activism as a sequential process allows for a more detailed description of its evolution
than previous academic studies. Hedge fund activists achieve di¤erent levels of success with the
various tactics they employ and do not seem to use ownership strategically to a¤ect campaign
21Note that these events represent a non-random sample of campaigns below the 5% ling threshold because
they involve large and newsworthy targets with above-average press coverage.
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outcomes. Common demands consist of major operational or capital structure changes and
frequently involve consideration of strategic alternatives. Activists are becoming more con-
frontational and are not afraid to go to a proxy ght or even bid for a target if its management
refuses to listen to their demands. These observations add to the empirical evidence on what
makes hedge funds more successful monitors than other types of institutional activists.
Table 1, Panel A, presents the distribution of hedge fund activist campaigns by year.22 The
number of activist events increased more than three times from 135 in 2001 to 565 in 2007,
signicantly outpacing the growth of hedge fund assets under management during the same
period. More importantly, there was a substantial shift in the activistspreferred tactics from
informal negotiations to more confrontational (and public) approaches. Hedge fund activists
requested board representation in 16.81% of the campaigns in 2007 versus only 11.85% in 2001
(a 42% increase). The use of the proxy process showed a 50% increase - 12.21% in 2007 versus
8.15% in 2001. Both trends suggest that activist hedge funds are increasingly following a more
hostile (and public) approach.
Insert Table 1
Panel B of Table 1 describes the progression of a typical campaign across the stages of the
activist process as dened in this paper. The rst two columns summarize the data for the
original activist sample, which includes 5645 individual lings involving 129 hedge fund groups
and 1164 unique targets. The last two columns of the table present the CRSP-Compustat
merged sample, which includes 4610 individual lings and 953 unique targets.23
22The analysis in Panel A of Table 1 excludes the rst year of the sample period to correct for left censoring
(i.e. campaigns initiated before the beginning of the sample period).
23TargetsCIK codes obtained from Schedule 13D lings are manually matched to PERMNOs, which signif-
icanly improves the overall match with CRSP-Compustat.
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As seen in Table 1, more than two-thirds of activists quit before making formal demands to
the target. These hedge funds may have led Schedule 13D for legal reasons or in anticipation
of an activist engagement but decided against it. From the sample of activists who formally
communicate specic demands to their targets, less than 20 percent proceed to request a board
seat and only 10-12% threaten a proxy contest. Surprisingly, only 7% of activist campaigns
end up in a proxy ght.
The most active hedge funds during 2000 to 2007 are Loeb Partners Corp/Third Point
Management, Millennium Management, Steel Partners II LP, Farallon Capital and ValueAct
Capital Management. The top 25 hedge funds listed in Table 2 account for more than half of
all campaigns in the sample period. The most confrontational hedge fund activists are Carl
Icahn, Steel Partners II LP, Financial Edge Fund LP, Bulldog Investors GP, Barington Capital
Group LP/Clinton Group and Ramius LLC. The evidence suggests that both experience and
preference for a specic tactic may be important in explaining the activists behavior. In the
main empirical analysis, I show that both xed e¤ects are statistically signicant.
Insert Table 2
Activist Demands and Success Rates
Table 3, Panel A, presents the most common activist demands in the sample period.24 As
previously documented in the literature, the most frequent demand is for a sale of the company
to a third party (one third of all events), followed by demands for higher dividends (share
24The total number of demands listed in the table exceeds the number of campaigns with formal demands as
in some campaigns activists make multiple (usually two) demand.
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repurchases), and restructuring of ine¢ cient operations. Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue
that activism targets earn high returns primarily when they are eventually taken over. (p.
363) In the robustness section, I evaluate the impact of takeover activity on campaign outcomes
and nd that the average return di¤erence between the M&A and non-M&A samples is not
statistically signicant after propensity-score matching on demand success.
Insert Table 3
The impact of takeover activity on event outcomes warrants further discussion. As Carl
Icahn points out, it would be simplistic to suggest that activists simply bang on the boardroom
table and demand a sale: While sometimes selling the company is the right approach because
of the synergies that come from a takeover, my overall strategy is more complex: it is to
force lackluster managements to sustainably improve their performance. This is frequently
an arduous and complex process. Simple solutions are rarely obvious. In numerous cases, we
have taken board seats to work with existing managements to help build value. ... As board
members, we dont simply bang on the boardroom table and demand a sale, but work hard
with existing managements to create lasting value. This benets all shareholders, not just us.
It is hard to reconcile these facts with the [...] statement that my strategy is simply to sell
the company.25
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is that in more than 10% of the events the
activist himself bids for a target (o¤ers to take it private). In the majority of cases, the
activists bid follows a hostile response by the targets management to a previous demand
25Another View: Icahn Defends His Record by Carl Icahn, published in the New York Times on August
17, 2011 (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/another-view-carl-icahn-defends-his-record/).
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for a sale. A hedge fund bid galvanizes the takeover process and sets a reasonable lower
bound on future takeover o¤ers. This is one way in which activist shareholders occupy an
important middle groundbetween internal governance by blockholders and board of directors
and external governance by the market for corporate control. The activists motivation - to
attract high bids from third parties - is distinctly di¤erent from the motivation for a toehold
acquisition (to help a future takeover by the toehold buyer). Consequently, this type of activist
bid is typically considered as another activist demand (see for example, Brav et al. (2008)).
Table 3 also reports the average success rate of each demand. As in previous studies of
hedge fund activism (see Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009)), an activist campaign
is classied as successful if the activist achieves his main investment objective(s) or reaches a
partial agreement with the target. Activists are most successful when demanding a sale (or
privatization) of the target, restructuring of ine¢ cient operations and additional disclosure but
less successful when asking for higher dividends (or repurchases), CEO removal or executive
compensation changes. In terms of their demands, 29.17% of activists achieve their objectives.
Note that classifying board representation as an activist tactic rather than a campaign demand
lowers the estimated success rate of activism compared to previous studies.26 Using holding
period activist returns as an alternative measure of success, I nd that only the highest quartile
of campaigns earn positive returns (see the return analysis presented in Table 8).
Panel B of Table 3 reports the success rate of activism by stage. I nd that more con-
frontational activist tactics have higher success rates. The most successful activist stage is the
proxy contest, in which 57.38% of activists achieve their objectives. Board representation is
e¤ective in 39.33% of the cases while demand negotiations are successful in only 6.76% of the
26 Including board representation demands raises the success rate in my sample to 46%, which is in line with
the estimates in Brav et al. (2008) and Greenwood and Schor (2009).
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campaigns. These results need to be interpreted with caution as the decision to continue an
activist engagement is endogenous to each campaign.
The Activists Investment Horizon and Capital Commitment
Are hedge fund activists short-term investors who make a quick prot at the expense of long-
term shareholders? The data do not support this criticism. Panel A of Table 4 reveals that the
average duration of an activist campaign is 15 months. Excluding events in which no formal
demands were announced raises the average campaign horizon to 19 months.27
Insert Table 4
Panel B of Table 4 reports that the mean (median) duration of an activist stage is seven
(three) months. There is a virtually no variability in the mean (median) duration among the
di¤erent stages of the process. This empirical observation serves as the basis for the convenient
modelling assumption that each stage of the activist process has a xed duration.
What is the activists capital commitment during a campaign? Panel A of Table 5 reports
that the mean (median) initial ownership stake at the start of a campaign is 8.27% (8.00%)
of the targets outstanding shares. In terms of the average target valuation of $868.52 million,
the mean (median) initial dollar stake is $71.83 million ($69.48 million). The mean (median)
maximum ownership stake over the duration of the campaign is 9.11% (9.00%).
Insert Table 5
27Brav et al. (2008) report a similar median duration for the campaigns in their sample - 12 months based
only on completed events and 19 months based on predictive regressions for all events.
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Another interesting question is whether activists vary their ownership with the tactics they
employ. Panel A of Table 5 reports that the median percentage change in ownership between
two activism stages is only 2.94%, which corresponds to a 0.24% ownership increase based on
the median activist stake of 8%. The mean change in ownership is 1.63%. The small magnitude
of these changes suggests that activists do not use high ownership to exert pressure in their
negotiations with the target.
Panel B of Table 5 further evaluates the role of activist ownership on campaign outcomes by
comparing ownership and maximum ownership between successful and unsuccessful campaigns
(dened in terms of demand outcomes). The di¤erence in ownership and maximum ownership
between the two samples is not statistically signicant after propensity-score matching on
predicted probability of success.28
Characteristics of Target Companies
What are some important characteristics of activist targets that di¤erentiate them from other
rms? Table 6 compares the typical target to the average CRSP/Compustat rm in terms of
several valuation, capital structure, performance and information asymmetry variables. The
last two columns of Table 6 report di¤erences between activist targets and other CRSP/Compustat
rms after propensity-score matching in terms of industry, size and book-to-market.
Insert Table 6
28 In unreported results, I use activist tactic, campaign duration and institutional ownership to predict the
success of an activist campaign. Ownership and/or ownership squared are not statistically signicant in deter-
mining a campaigns probability of success.
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Table 6 reveals that activist targets are signicantly smaller than matched rms, with a
mean market value of $868.52 million and Q ratio of 1.30. However, activist targets are not
statistically di¤erent from the average CRSP/Compustat rm in terms of growth opportunities
(proxied by market-to-book ratio) or book leverage. Target rms have lower sales growth
compared to their matched counterparts but do not show statistically signicant di¤erences
in terms of protability (ROA), asset turnover, market share or research and development
costs (R&D expense/assets). More importantly, targets have signicantly higher institutional
ownership, which is a critical determinant of campaign success in the more confrontational
stages of activism. Overall, hedge fund activists seem to target small rms with no signicant
operational problems but serious market underperformance which most likely results from
agency problems.
In terms of their industry a¢ liation, most activist targets are in manufacturing and services.
The individual two-digit SIC codes with the highest concentration of activism are business
services (17% of all targets), retail (11%), chemicals (9%), electronic equipment (7%), and
instruments (7%). The xed e¤ects for each of the above groups are not statistically signicant.
There is also no evidence of industry concentration by hedge fund activist, except for highly
specialized industries such as medical instruments and depository institutions. Intuitively,
focusing on underperformance issues general to most rms (such as agency problems) reduces
the activists marginal cost of initiating a campaign.
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0.6 Empirical Results
0.6.1 Costs of Activist Campaigns
The main goal of this study is to estimate the costs of activist engagements implied by the
observed investment decisions of hedge fund activists. At each stage of the process, an activist
must choose whether to continue or exit his campaign based on a cost-benet analysis of
the intervention. In order to account for the heterogeneity of activist events in terms of
their duration and exit stage, I estimate the costs of three common activist tactics - demand
negotiations, board representation and proxy contest.29 The cost of an activist campaign
equals the sum of the costs of its component stages.
The estimation methodology uses the activists break-even prot constraint for monitoring
(as dened in equation 12) to determine the cost thresholds of the three activism stages -
demand negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. Each cost cuto¤ represents a
lower bound on the costs of employing a specic engagement tactic. The empirical design
consists of two parts - a system of conditional binary logistic regressions, which separately
derives the costs of each stage, and statistical backward induction, which uses the estimated
costs of the later stages of activism in the calculation of the costs of its earlier stages.
The starting point of the estimation procedure is the last decision step - the decision node
before the proxy contest stage. The conditional sample of activists who reach that node are
divided into two sub-groups - those who choose to exit after board representation (coded as
0) and those who continue to a proxy contest (coded as 1). I regress an activists continuation
29 In order to provide more robust estimates, I combine proxy threat and proxy ght into proxy contest
resulting in three distinct stages - demand negotiations, board representation and proxy contest.
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decision on his expected gross return from a successful intervention, which summarizes the
benet from campaign continuation, and (the inverse of) his marked-to-market investment
in the target, which captures the cost of the campaign. As described in equation 13, the
rst regression coe¢ cient determines the relative magnitude of proxy costs while the second
coe¢ cient identies the absolute magnitude of these costs (as in equation 14). Then, I use the
estimated costs of the proxy stage in a backward induction procedure to derive the costs of
board representation and demand negotiations.
Table 7 presents the main empirical results. Panel A reports average costs for demand
negotiations, board representation and proxy contest, including their bias-corrected bootstrap
condence intervals. The cost of an activist campaign that ends in a proxy contest is $10.71
million. The proxy stage has the highest cost equal to $5.94 million for the average campaign
(with a 95% condence interval of $3.04 - $10.86 million). This stage typically involves signif-
icant disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy solicitors, corporate governance experts,
investment banks, public relations and advertising rms as well as printing and postage costs
to reach a targets shareholders.
Insert Table 7
The limited anecdotal evidence available can help us put these costs into perspective.
Stephen M. Bainbridge estimates the costs of a proxy contest at $1.8 million based on a survey
conducted in the late 1980s (see Thomas et al. (1998)) but points out that costs almost
certainly are much higher today.30 In a letter to the SEC, Ralph V. Whitworth, principal
of activist hedge fund Relational Investors LLC argues that . . . only a few investors have
30A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal by Stephen M. Bainbridge, December 19, 2003
(http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/bainbridge121903.htm).
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the expertise and resources to execute a short slate campaign which in our experience can
cost upwards of $10,000,000 at a typical large U.S. company.31 Carl Icahn, one of the most
well-known activists, agrees: At a large public company, mailing, printing and other costs can
run into the millions of dollars.32
The demand negotiations stage is the second most expensive stage of the activist process,
with average costs of $2.94 million (and a 95% condence interval of $0.89 - $6.96 million). The
estimates presented in this paper are the rst attempt in the literature to quantify the costs of
activist-target negotiations. Unlike the proxy contest stage, most of the costs of the rst stage
are unobservable and cannot be estimated from publicly-available information. However, the
disclosure and legal fees associated with demand negotiations most likely represent a smaller
portion of the overall costs compared to unobservable costs such as the time and e¤ort of the
activist.
Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2008) suggest that unobservable costs dominate the over-
all costs of private demand negotiations: Shareholder activism is predominantly executed
through private interventions as opposed to shareholder proposals at a companys annual
meeting, or ling of proxy statements. ... These engagements involved numerous meetings
and telephone calls with chairmen, CEOs, and CFOs..., other executives, divisional managers,
heads of investor relations, and with non-executive board members, ... [The Fund] also pri-
vately contacted other institutional shareholders, with a view to communicating its engagement
objectives and soliciting support for its activities. Strikingly, engagements rarely took a public
form.(p. 3096).
31Letter from Ralph V. Whitworth, Principal of Relational Investors LLC, to the SEC, Aug. 14, 2009
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf).
32Were Not the Boss of A.I.G.op-ed by Carl Icahn, published in The New York Times on March 29, 2009
(http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/were-not-the-boss-of-aig/).
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The least expensive stage is board representation, which adds $1.83 million to the cost of
the average campaign (with a 95% bootstrap condence interval of $0.46 - $4.32 million). Most
of these costs can be attributed to the activists time commitment as a board member or his
e¤ort to identify board representatives. At this stage, many activists also hire consulting or
investment banking rms to prepare formal board presentations of their recommendations. For
example, in late 2005, Carl Icahn hired Lazard to prepare a report on the strategic alternatives
available to Time Warner for a $5 million fee as well as 5 percent of whatever Mr. Icahns
dissident group makes on its Time Warner shares above $18 over the next 18 months.33
Another activist, Nelson Peltz of Trian Partners, paid Bear Stearns as much as $1.6 million in
2006 for advisory work on his bid for board seats at H.J. Heinz.34
Panel A of Table 7 also reports the scale parameters used to identify the absolute mag-
nitude of stage costs. As pointed out earlier, these scale parameters account for unobserved
heterogeneity in the activist sample and improve the precision of the cost estimates. As ex-
pected, the proxy contest has the lowest scale parameter while the negotiations stage has the
highest scale parameter. Intuitively, we expect the scale parameters to become smaller with
every consecutive stage because the activists employing more confrontational tactics are more
homogeneous.
The cost of an average completecampaign that ends in a proxy contest is $10.71 million.
This compares favorably to the hypothetical break-even fees calculated in reference to a typical
hedge fund incentive schedule (80% of assets under management and 20% performance fees).
Assuming that performance fees equal the abnormal returns earned in a campaign, the mean
(median) fees based on value-weighted abnormal returns (as reported in Table 8) are $12.4 mil-
33As reported in The New York Times, December 7, 2005 (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/business/07icahn.html)
34Reported in Board Member Magazine, 2010, http://www.boardmember.com/MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=5251.
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lion ($11.1 million) while the mean (median) fees in excess of characteristic-based benchmark
portfolios are $17.3 million ($12.1 million).
Panel A of Table 7 also presents several goodness-of-t measures for each stage-specic
logistic regression. Overall, the best model t is in the proxy contest stage and the worst in
the demand negotiations stage. The model correctly classies the activistsexit decisions in
58% of demand negotiations versus 78% of proxy contests. The R2 is highest for the proxy
stage (20.40%) and lowest for demand negotiations (17.90%).
Panel B of Table 7 presents additional information about each stage-specic binary logistic
regression. The estimation allows for correlation among the campaigns of the same hedge
fund activist (clustering) and model misspecication (incorrect likelihood function). Both
explanatory variables are signicant at 1% in all three regressions. The economic signicance
of the explanatory variables is higher in the more confrontational stages of the process.
Due to the recursive backward substitution of estimated costs, the procedure of statisti-
cal backward induction yields biased estimates of the standard errors in the rst two stages
(board representation and demand negotiations). To correct for this bias, I use non-parametric
bootstrap to calculate standard errors. Bootstrapping involves repeated sampling (with re-
placement) from the dataset at hand to estimate the error terms. I calculate bias-corrected
bootstrap condence intervals for the cost estimates, where the bias correction adjusts for the
potential bias in the tails of the sampling distribution. The bias-corrected bootstrap condence
intervals are very similar to the normal condence intervals.
39
0.6.2 Returns to Hedge Fund Activism
The estimated monitoring costs are economically signicant both in absolute terms and in
terms of net returns. In order to compare net activist returns to the average total returns
earned by hedge funds, I calculate abnormal activist returns in excess of the value-weighted
CRSP portfolio (VW returns) and in excess of characteristic-based portfolios following the
approach in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) (DGTW returns). Under both
benchmarks, abnormal activist returns drop by about two-thirds after subtracting activist
costs.
First, I manually match the hedge funds in the activist sample to institutional (13F) data
from Thomson Reuters. I am able to match 85 of the 129 hedge fund families in this study.35
(Table 2 reports the 13F match for the 25 hedge funds with the most activist campaigns in
2000-2007). Then, I compute hedge fund returns following the methodology in Gri¢ n and Xu
(2009) who estimate monthly returns using the latest quarterly-end holding weights of each
fund. As Gri¢ n and Xu (2009) argue, monthly returns based on 13F holdings are better suited
to evaluating hedge fund performance because they do not su¤er from the return manipulation
and survivorship bias of self-reported hedge fund returns.36 Even though 13F monthly returns
ignore short term trading (within a quarter), they exhibit high correlation with the returns
reported in hedge fund databases and are representative of hedge fund returns in general.
As Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue in their discussion of hedge fund activist returns,
[w]hile the raw abnormal returns are suggestive, they are confounded by volatility in both
35Hedge funds with assets under management in excess of $100 million are required to report quarterly to the
SEC all of their long equity positions over $200,000 or 10,000 shares.
36Public hedge fund databases such as CISDM and TASS cover less than half of the hedge funds in the activist
sample.
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market returns and abnormal returns accruing to value-growth and momentum-based strate-
gies. . . Identifying the benchmark is particularly important in this exercise . . .  (p. 373). I
follow their approach and calculate DGTW abnormal returns in excess of the returns on 125
characteristic portfolios based on size, market-to-book and stock return momentum.37
Table 8 reports the activist returns of the hedge funds in the sample. Panel A presents
deal-period and annualized raw campaign returns. The annualized mean (median) raw return
is 31.48% (26.10%), comparable to the returns reported in Brav et al. (2008). Panel B reports
VW and DGTW annualized abnormal returns. The annualized mean (median) VW abnormal
return is 4.02% (3.89%) while the mean (median) DGTW abnormal return is 5.75% (7.61%).
The conclusion reached in Brav et al. (2008) that the positive average returns are attributed
to the right tail of the distribution(p. 1760) seems to hold for the campaigns in this extended
sample.
Panel C reports annualized abnormal net returns (that is, returns after subtracting activist
costs). The annualized mean (median) VW abnormal return drops to 0.23% (1.40%) while the
mean (median) DGTW abnormal return becomes 2.38% (3.85%). Both measures show that
costs consume about two-thirds of gross activist returns. It is also interesting to note that the
proxy contest stage has the lowest mean abnormal net returns implying that the proxy process
may be value-destroying from the point of view of the activist.
Insert Table 8
Do hedge funds earn higher returns on their activist investments than on their other hold-
37As Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) argue, characteristic-based returns "have more statistical
power to detect abnormal performance than factor models" (p. 1037).
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ings? The last row of Table 9 helps answer this question by reporting the total portfolio returns
of the hedge funds with 13F holdings information. The annualized mean (median) VW abnor-
mal portfolio return is 14.84% (15.84%) while the mean (median) DGTW abnormal return is
17.18% (16.38%). Even though the mean activist return is signicantly lower than the mean
portfolio return of the hedge funds in the sample, the top quartile of activists earn signicantly
higher returns on their activist investments than on their non-activist holdings.38 Note also
the annualized standard deviation of net activist returns is about ve times higher than the
standard deviation of total portfolio returns.
The above results lead to two conclusions. First, subtracting costs signicantly reduces
gross activist returns suggesting that costs play a major role in the decision-making process of
an activist shareholder. Second, the returns of the top quartile of activists exceed the returns
on their portfolio holdings even though the average hedge fund activist performs worse in
activist targets than in other portfolio companies.
0.7 Robustness
0.7.1 Expected Activist Reward
The maximum potential value of a rm is unobservable and measuring it directly is not possible.
In the main results, I calculate a targets expected value improvement in terms of the valuation
of a matched peer with the same fundamentals (following the approach in Edmans, Goldstein
and Jiang (2011)). In particular, I use a censored quantile regression of the targets Q ratio on
38The 75th-percentile of net activist returns is not statistically di¤erent from the 75th-percentile of total
returns. However, the 90th-percentile of VW (DGTW) net activist return is 56.51% (44.20%), signicantly
exceeding the 90th-percentile portfolio returns (27.23% and 29.62%, respectively).
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the tercile ranks of rm characteristics, which are likely to remain una¤ected by the activists
demands - size, asset turnover, market share, growth and R&D ratio.
I also conrm that the estimation of a targets maximum potential value is robust to an
alternative specication, in which I assume that the activist can improve a targets value to
that of the best performing industry peer in the same value tercile. Industry (also known as
"comparable company") analysis is frequently used in evaluating potential takeover targets.
As seen in Table 9, Panel B, both explanatory variables have similarly high statistical and
economic power in this alternative specication (even though expected gross return is now
signicant at 5% in some regressions).
Insert Table 9
The estimation of a targets fundamental value must reect the potential for value improve-
ment in a successful campaign. This is achieved by calibrating a parameter in the quantile
estimation to the median valuation improvement achieved by successful activists (calculated
at 35.38%). Table 10 reports a comparison of expected reward measures between successful
and failed campaigns by activist stage. The mean expected activist reward is 36.47% in the
successful sample compared to 32.18% in the unsuccessful one. The di¤erence between the two
samples is not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Insert Table 10
The median valuation improvement in successful campaigns has an order of magnitude
similar to the mean (median) abnormal buy-and-hold return earned by the average successful
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hedge fund activist. The mean (median) VW adjusted return is 41.75% (17.68%) and the
mean (median) DGTW adjusted return is 27.20% (36.16%).
0.7.2 Activist Heterogeneity
One way in which I correct for unobserved activist heterogeneity is by computing stage-specic
scale parameters, as shown in table 7. A more direct way to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity is to control for activist-specic attributes in the estimation of the cost thresholds.
Table 11 presents the same three logistic regressions as the baseline model but adds three
additional explanatory variables capturing activist heterogeneity. The additional covariates
are the number of contemporaneous campaigns by a hedge fund activist in a given quarter, an
indicator (Active HFs) for the 12 hedge funds with the most campaigns in the sample period
(measuring experience) and an indicator (Hostile HFs) for the 12 hedge funds with the most
proxy contests between 2000-2007 (measuring preference for confrontational engagements).
The list of the respective hedge funds in each group is presented in table 2.
Insert Table 11
The included activist characteristics have high explanatory power at most stages. The
indicator variable measuring the number of contemporaneous campaigns by the same hedge
fund activist has the lowest economic signicance. The other two additional covariates have
the highest economic signicance in the proxy stage. The results suggest that a rm targeted
by a hostile activist is more likely to reach a confrontational stage while a rm targeted by a
more experienced activist is less likely to make that transition.
44
0.7.3 Ownership, Takeover Activity and Learning
Dening the activists break-even constraint for monitoring assumes that the size of the own-
ership stake does not a¤ect the success of the engagement. Panel A of Table 5 revealed that
the mean (median) change in ownership between activism stages is minimal implying that an
activist would not increase his ownership to exert pressure in his negotiations with the target.
I further evaluate this assumption in a multivariate setting by estimating the probability of a
successful campaign outcome as a function of ownership (ownership squared), the tactic used by
the activist, the duration of the campaign and institutional ownership. Activism tactic (stage)
is included because more confrontational stages are typically associated with higher success
rates. Campaign duration controls for the activists investment horizon, the assumption being
that longer campaigns have a higher probability to achieve success. Institutional ownership
is an important determinant of success in the more confrontational stages of activism. The
(unreported) results conrm that ownership and/or ownership squared are not statistically
signicant in determining a campaigns probability of success.
Finally, I re-estimate costs excluding campaigns, in which the activists stake exceeds the
95th-percentile of ownership in the sample (16%). Note that this level of ownership is below
the level required to inuence company procedures relying on shareholder voting. For example,
85% of S&P 500 companies impose ownership thresholds above 25% to call a special meeting
or do not give their shareholders that right.39 The exclusion of high ownership campaigns has
no e¤ect on the estimated costs.
Table 12 reports a comparison of abnormal activist returns between the campaigns ending
39See article from ISSs Ted Allen, April 2011, http://www.deallawyers.com/Blog/2011/04/proxy-season-
preview-takeover-defenses.html.
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in M&A and those with no M&A activity. I manually collect M&A data for the activist targets
from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum restricting the announcement date of a takeover to be
within the duration of an activist campaign. The mean di¤erence in abnormal VW (DGTW)
excess returns is 26.77% (13.83%) in terms of annualized gross returns and 26.13% (14.58%)
in terms of net returns. The unmatched results conrm Greenwood et al. (2009)s conclusion
that only events resulting in a sale earn signicant abnormal returns.
Insert Table 12
However, the average return di¤erence between the M&A and non-M&A samples is not
statistically signicant after propensity-score matching in terms of campaign outcome, i.e. after
controlling for whether the activists demands were successfully implemented. This suggests
that a campaigns demand outcome successfully explains the di¤erence in returns between
events with and without takeover activity.
I also verify (in unreported results) that learning has no e¤ect on campaign outcomes. I
compare successful and failed campaigns in terms of proxies for activist learning. The rst
proxy cumulative board signals - consists of hand-collected communication between the ac-
tivist and the target. These exchanges - letters, phone conversation transcripts, presentations,
etc. disclosed as part of Schedule 13D - are coded as positive or negative and aggregated
for each campaign. The other two proxies for learning are the number of material lings by
an activist and the current length of a campaign. None of the learning proxies is statistically
di¤erent between successful and failed campaigns after propensity-score matching in terms of
a campaigns predicted probability of success.
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0.8 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper is to measure the costs of activist monitoring and provide a better
understanding of the net returns to activism. I focus on the principal cost-benet trade-o¤
facing an activist and study its e¤ect on the choice of negotiation tactics in communicating
with a target rm.
The approach taken in this study consists of two interrelated parts. First, I model activism
as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation and
proxy contest, and dene the activists break-even constraint for monitoring. Then, I transform
the activists break-even condition into a discrete-choice framework and estimate the costs of
activism implied by the observed decision making behavior of activists between 2000 and 2007.
This paper complements recent work on hedge fund activism by providing cost benchmarks
for evaluating the net returns to activism. In order to account for the large heterogeneity of
activist events, I estimate the costs associated with three common activist approaches - demand
negotiations, board representation and proxy contest. I nd that the average campaign ending
in a proxy ght costs $10.71 million. Subtracting costs reduces the mean abnormal activist
return by two-thirds suggesting that costs play a major role in the activists decision-making
behavior. Even though the mean net return is close to zero, the top quartile of activists earn
higher returns on their activist holdings than on their non-activist portfolios.
This paper also introduces a comprehensive hand-collected dataset of hedge fund activist
campaigns between 2000 and 2007, which contains detailed information about the evolution of
each campaign and the negotiation tactics employed by activists. The large-sample evidence
presented in this paper aids in understanding the nature and evolution of activist engagements.
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0.9 Appendices
0.9.1 Appendix A: SEC Schedule 13D
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13d-1 to 13d-6, contains the ling requirements
for large shareholders. Schedule 13D is commonly referred to as a "benecial ownership report"
and must be submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission within 10 days by any
investor who acquires ownership of 5% of the voting stock of a public company. Any material
changes in the facts contained in the original ling (such as a change in benecial ownership
by more than 1%, a change in the investment intent or the preferred method of communicating
with the rm) requires a prompt amendment.
Schedule 13D consists of seven sections:
1. Security and Issuer - Basic information regarding the type and class of security and the
contact information of the benecial owner
2. Identity and Background - Background information such as the type of investment busi-
ness the owner engages in and related investment vehicles managed by the owner
3. Source and Amount of Funds or Other Considerations - The source of the owners in-
vestment capital (usually working capital funds)
4. Purpose of Transaction - This is the most important portion of the 13D ling for the pur-
poses of this study. It describes the benecial owners investment intent, main demands
and level of engagement with the rm.
5. Interest in Securities of the Issuer - Expands on section 4
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6. Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with Respect to the Securities
of the Issuer - Any special relationships between the benecial owner and the company
7. Materials to Be Filed as Exhibits - This is the second most important section. It contains
any exhibits that may be led along with the form such as letters to the management
or board of the rm as well any agreements between the two parties. Exhibits can also
elaborate on the Purpose of Transaction (Section 4).
Item 4 lists 10 specic actions of a large shareholder that would require disclosure:
(a) The acquisition by any person of additional securities of the issuer, or the disposition
of securities of the issuer;
(b) An extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation,
involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries;
(c) A sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries;
(d) Any change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer, including any
plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors or to ll any existing vacancies
on the board;
(e) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the issuer;
(f) Any other material change in the issuers business or corporate structure including
but not limited to, if the issuer is a registered closed-end investment company, any plans or
proposals to make any changes in its investment policy for which a vote is required by section
13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940;
(g) Changes in the issuers charter, bylaws or instruments corresponding thereto or other
actions which may impede the acquisition of control of the issuer by any person;
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(h) Causing a class of securities of the issuer to be delisted from a national securities
exchange, or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a
registered national securities association;
(i) A class of equity securities of the issuer becoming eligible for termination of registration
pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act; or
(j) Any action similar to any of those enumerated above.
Note: Schedule 13G is an alternative SEC ling for the 13D which must be led by anyone
who acquires benecial ownership in a public company (i.e. owns more than 5% of a com-
pany). The 13G ling is considered a more passive version of the 13D, and has fewer reporting
requirements. Activist practices are not permitted by 13G lers unless they re-le a 13D.
0.9.2 Appendix B: Carl Icahn & Time Warner Inc.
On August 9, 2005, Dow Jones reported that Carl Icahn had started accumulating a stake
in Time Warner Inc. and was exploring institutional support for his plan to restructure the
Company.40 Among Icahns demands were a break-up of the media conglomerate and a sub-
stantial increase of its share repurchase program. Initial conversations with Richard Parsons,
Time Warners CEO, were characterized as productivebut did not result in an agreement
on the right approach to increase shareholder value.
On September 12, Mr. Icahn took the next step in his campaign by proposing nominees
to Time Warners board. He argued that shareholder-nominated directors were particularly
40This case study illustrates the challenges in performing a cost-benet analysis of an activist campaign. Press
reports and quarterly holdings information from SEC 13F lings are the only sources of information. This skews
the available evidence in favor of larger and more visible activists and companies.
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important at Time Warner because of the di¤erence of opinion between many large share-
holders and management concerning the direction of the company and the lack of share price
performance under current management.
A month later, on October 11, Carl Icahn escalated his campaign to the preliminary proxy
stage and issued an open letter to all shareholders (reported in a Schedule 14A): In life and
in business, there are two cardinal sins. The rst is to act precipitously without thought, and
the second is to not act at all. Unfortunately, the Board of Directors and top management of
Time Warner already committed the rst sin by merging with AOL, and we believe they are
currently in the process of committing the second.41 Icahn enumerated the following failures
of the current management and board: the AOL disaster, re saleof Warner Music and
Comedy Central, failure to acquire MGM, and bloatedcost structure.
On October 31, Steve Case, co-founder of AOL and one of the main architects of its
merger with Time Warner, resigned from the board of directors. Two days later, the Company
increased its current stock buyback program from $5 billion to $12.5 billion. At the same time,
Time Warner was exploring a sale of its publishing business, which was completed in February
2006.
Dissatised with the progress of his campaign, Icahn hired Lazard to prepare a report on
the strategic alternatives available to Time Warner. In a press release, Icahn described the
nancial terms of the Lazard engagement: a $5 million fee and "an additional incentive fee"
of 5% of any increase in Time Warners price over $18 in the next 18 months.42 Several days
later, Robert C. Clark, a board member of both Time Warner and Lazard resigned from Time
41See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000110465905047809/a05-17463_1ex2.htm.
42Press release available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000229/dfan14a.txt.
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Warners board.
On December 19, 2005, Mr. Icahn openly questioned the Companys agreement to sell a
stake in AOL to Google Inc. "On the eve of a proxy contest, I believe it would be a blatant
breach of duciary duty to enter into an agreement with Google that would either foreclose
the possibility of entering into a transaction that would be more benecial for Time Warner
shareholders or make such a transaction more di¢ cult to achieve."43 On January 30, 2006,
Carl Icahn proposed Frank Biondi, a former CEO of Universal Studios Inc. and Viacom Inc.
to replace Richard Parsons and lead the restructuring of Time Warner.
On February 7, 2006, Carl Icahn and Lazard released a 343-page analysis of Time Warner,
which recommended that the Company be split into four independent entities (the AOL online
division, a lm and cable networks company, a publishing company and a cable operator),
reduce costs and repurchase a total of $20 billion of company stock.
Ten days later, Time Warner announced an agreement with Carl Icahn to increase its
existing share repurchase program to $20 billion and extend its duration through December
31, 2007. In addition, the Company agreed to appoint two new independent directors based on
recommendations from major shareholders such as Icahn Partners and achieve cost reductions
of $1 billion in 2007.44 Icahns demand for a break-up of the company was not part of the
agreement, probably because of its lukewarm reception among other institutional investors.
Estimating Carl Icahns nancial gain from this campaign is di¢ cult without detailed
trading data. However, we can approximate the benets of the campaign by the increase
in value of Icahns ownership stake between December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2006, the
43See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000239/dfan14a1219.txt.
44See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847506000082/dfan14a02172006.txt.
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rst and last 13F lings reporting an ownership stake in Time Warner. In that period, Time
Warners adjusted closing price increased by $9.02 (26.37%), giving Icahn a gross prot of
$100.12 million.
53
Bibliography
[1] Admati, Anat, Paul Peiderer and Josef Zechner, 1994. Large shareholder activism, risk
sharing and nancial market equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 102 (6), 1097-1130.
[2] Bas, Muhammet Ali, Curtis S. Signorino and Robert Walker, 2008, Statistical backwards
induction: A simple method for estimating recursive strategic models, Political Analysis
16(1), 21-40.
[3] Becht, Marco, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, 2008. Returns to share-
holder activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Review of
Financial Studies 22(8), 3093-3129.
[4] Bolton, Patrick and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998, Blocks, liquidity and corporate
control, Journal of Finance 53(1), 1-25.
[5] Bradley, Michael, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein and Wei Jiang, 2010, Activist arbitrage: A
study of open-ending attempts of closed-end funds, Journal of Financial Economics 95(1),
1-19.
[6] Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas, 2008, Hedge fund activism,
corporate governance, and rm performance, Journal of Finance 63(4), 1729-1773.
[7] Cli¤ord, Christopher P., 2008, Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder
activists, Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 323-336.
[8] Cohn, Jonathan and Uday Rajan, 2011, Optimal corporate governance in the presence of
an activist investor, Working paper, University of Michigan.
[9] Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman and Russ Wermers, 1997, Measuring
mutual fund performance with characteristic-based benchmarks, Journal of Finance 52
(3), 1035-1058.
54
[10] Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth I. Wolpin, 1989, The specication and estimation of dynamic
stochastic discrete choice models: A survey, Journal of Human Resources, 24(4), 562-598.
[11] Edmans, Alex and Gustavo Manso, 2011, Governance through exit and voice: A theory
of multiple blockholders, Review of Financial Studies 24(7), 2395-2428.
[12] Edmans, Alex, Itay Goldstein and Wei Jiang, 2011, The Real E¤ects of Financial Markets:
The Impact of Prices on Takeovers, Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
[13] Gillan, Stuart and Laura Starks, 2007, The evolution of shareholder activism in the United
States, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 19, 5573.
[14] Greenwood, Robin and Michael Schor, 2009, Investor activism and takeovers, Journal of
Financial Economics 92, 362-375.
[15] Gri¢ n, John and Jin Xu, 2009, How smart are the smart guys? A unique view from hedge
fund stock holdings, Review of Financial Studies 22(7), 2531-2570.
[16] Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1980. Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory
of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11, 4264.
[17] Hennessy, Christopher, Amnon Levy and Toni Whited, 2007, Testing Q theory with -
nancing frictions, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 691-717.
[18] Holderness, Cli¤ord, 2003, A survey of blockholders and corporate control, Economic
Policy Review 9(1).
[19] Kahan, Marcel, and Edward Rock, 2007, Hedge funds in corporate governance and cor-
porate control, Corporate Governance Law Review 3(2).
[20] Kahn, Charles and Andrew Winton, 1998, Ownership structure, speculation, and share-
holder intervention, Journal of Finance 53(1), 99-129.
[21] Karpo¤, Jonathan, M., 2001, The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A
survey of empirical ndings, Working paper, University of Washington.
[22] Klein, April, and Emanuel Zur, 2009, Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds
and other private investors, Journal of Finance 63(1), 187-229.
[23] Koenker, Roger and Gilbert Bassett, 1978, Regression quantiles, Econometrica 46, 33-50.
[24] Lemmon, Michael, Michael Roberts and Jaime Zender, 2008, Back to the beginning:
Persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure, Journal of Finance 63,
1575-1608.
55
[25] Madalla, G. S., 1983, Limited dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[26] Maug, Ernst, 1998, Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-o¤ between liquidity
and control?, Journal of Finance 53(1), 65-98.
[27] Powell, James, 1984, Least absolute deviations estimation for the censored regression
model, Journal of Econometrics 25, 303-325.
[28] Romano, Roberta, 2001, Less is more: Making shareholder activism a valued mechanism
of corporate governance, Yale Journal on Regulation 18, 174251.
[29] Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control,
Journal of Political Economy 94, 461488.
[30] Tirole, Jean, 2006, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
[31] Thomas, Randall and Catherine Dixon, 1998, Aranow & Einhorn on Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control, 3rd Edition, Aspen Law & Business.
[32] Train, Kenneth, 2003, Discrete choice methods with simulation, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[33] Yermack, David, 2010, Shareholder voting and corporate governance, Annual Review of
Financial Economics 2, 103-25.
56
Figure 1: A Sequential Denition of the Activist Process
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Table 1: Distribution of Activist Campaigns by Year and Activist Stage
The table presents the distribution of activist campaigns during 2000-2007. The full sample
consists of 1164 unique campaigns. The CRSP-Compustat sample contains 953 unique
events. Exclusions: bankruptcies, ADRs, REITS, funds, trusts and left-censored observations.
Panel A: Distribution of Activist Campaigns by Year
Year Negotiations Board Proxy Total
2001 22 16 11 135
16.30% 11.85% 8.15%
2002 32 27 12 189
16.93% 14.29% 6.35%
2003 44 22 18 225
19.56% 9.78% 8.00%
2004 38 32 18 237
16.03% 13.50% 7.59%
2005 98 46 36 371
26.42% 12.40% 9.70%
2006 115 73 54 469
24.52% 15.57% 11.51%
2007 117 95 69 565
20.71% 16.81% 12.21%
Growth (2000-2007) 27.07% 41.87% 49.88% 318.52%
Panel B: Distribution of Activist Campaigns by Stage
Activist Sample CRSP-Compustat Merge
Stage Targets % Total Targets % Total
Initial Filing 1164 100.00% 953 100.00%
Demand Negotiations 342 29.38% 300 31.48%
Board Representation 203 17.44% 179 18.78%
Proxy Threat 122 10.48% 113 11.86%
Proxy Fight 74 6.36% 68 7.14%
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Table 2: List of Activist Hedge Funds: 2000-2007
The table lists the 25 hedge funds with the most activist campaigns in 2000-2007. The sample includes
21 non-publicactivist campaigns with no SEC Schedule 13D. The column labeled 13F reports the
availability of holdings data from Thomson Reuters 13F Institutional Holdings used in return calculations.
Hedge Fund Activist Campaigns Proxy Contests 13F
Loeb Partners Corp./ Third Point Management Co 103 4 Y
Millennium Management, Millenco LLC 51 0 Y
Steel Partners II LP 48 6 Y
Farallon Capital Management LLC 48 0 Y
ValueAct Capital Management LP 35 1 Y
Hummingbird Management 35 0 N
Blum Capital Partners LP 26 0 Y
Carl Icahn 26 7 Y
Prides Capital Partners LLC 23 0 Y
Barington Capital Group LP/ Clinton Group 23 5 Y
Chap Cap Partners 21 0 Y
Ramius LLC 20 5 Y
Yorktown Avenue Capital/Boston Avenue Capital 19 0 N
Pirate Capital LLC 18 4 Y
Wynneeld Partners Small Cap Value LP 18 2 Y
SCSF Equities LLC 18 0 N
Riley Investment Management LLC 15 3 Y
Perry Corp 15 0 Y
Lawrence B. Seidman 15 7 N
Financial Edge Fund LP/ John Morrison 15 6 N
Jana Partners LLC 15 2 Y
Shamrock Activist Value Fund LP 14 1 Y
Bulldog Investors GP/ Phillip Goldstein 14 6 N
Cannell Capital LLC 13 0 Y
Harbinger Capital Partners 13 2 N
59
Table 3: Most Common Activist Demands
The table reports the primary and secondary demands of 342 campaigns with specic activist demands.
The sample includes 21 campaigns with no Schedule 13D ling (i.e., below the 5% ling threshold).
Panel A reports the number and success rate of various demands made to the targets management.
Panel B reports stage-specic success rates. Proxy contest is a combined proxy threat and ght stage.
Panel A: Success rate of activism by demand
Primary Activist Demands Number Campaigns Number Successful Success Rate
Sale of company to a third party 159 51 32.08%
Dividends/ repurchases/ excess cash 78 13 16.67%
Restructuring/ spin-o¤ 69 24 34.78%
Opposition to a proposed merger 63 18 28.57%
Take target private/bid 52 21 40.38%
Remove CEO or separate CEO/Chairman 27 5 18.52%
Recapitalization/ debt restructuring 22 7 31.82%
Excessive executive compensation 20 3 15.00%
Additional disclosure 14 5 35.71%
Overall Success Rate 29.17%
Panel B: Success rate of activism by stage
Number Campaigns Number Successful Success Rate
Exit after Demand Negotiations 342 23 6.76%
Exit after Board Representation 203 79 39.33%
Exit after Proxy Contest 122 70 57.38%
Overall Success Rate 29.17%
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Table 4: Duration of Activist Campaign
The table presents statistics on the duration of (the stages of) activist campaigns between 2000-2007.
The sample includes 21 campaigns with no Schedule 13D ling (i.e., below the 5% ling threshold).
Panel A reports statistics on the overall duration of activist campaigns. The last row of Panel A presents
information only for the campaigns in which the activist made specic demands to the target company.
Panel B presents the duration of each stage of the activist process as dened in the paper.
Panel A: Overall Duration of Activist Campaigns (in months)
25% 50% 75% 90% Mean SD
Exit after Initial Filing 0 5 13 25 9.42 13.52
Exit after Demand Negotiations 2 6.5 16 27 10.48 11.35
Exit after Board Representation 7 15 27 41 19.43 16.12
Exit after Proxy Contest 10 18 34 64 25.78 21.59
Average (per campaign) 3 9 20 36 14.66 16.96
Average (excl. no specic demands) 6 14 26 41 18.75 18.20
Panel B: Duration of Activism Stages (in months)
25% 50% 75% 90% Mean SD
Initial Filing 3 3 9 15 7.49 8.55
Demand Negotiations 3 3 6 12 6.44 6.89
Board Representation 3 3 9 15 6.79 7.03
Proxy Contest 3 3 6 15 6.90 7.09
Average (per stage) 3 3 9 15 7.28 8.54
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Table 5: Activist Ownership Analysis
The table reports ownership statistics for activist campaigns between 2000-2007 including 21 non-public
events with no Schedule 13D ling. Excluded are campaigns with no specic activist demands.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the activists initial ownership at the start of an activism stage,
maximum ownership stake accumulated during a stage and change in ownership between stages.
Panel B reports percentage ownership and maximum campaign ownership by activism outcome after
propensity-score matching on a campaigns predicted probability of success in terms of activist demands
(estimated as a function of the tactic used by the activist, campaign duration and institutional ownership).
Panel A: Ownership by Activist Stage, %
Initial Ownership Max Stage Ownership Ownership Change
50% 75% 95% Mean 50% 75% 95% Mean 50% Mean
Initial Filing 7.00 10.00 16.00 8.51 8.00 10.00 20.00 8.95 - -
Demand Negotiations 7.00 10.00 16.00 7.41 8.00 10.00 17.00 8.37 16.67 24.65
Board Representation 9.00 13.00 19.00 9.46 10.00 14.00 21.00 10.70 8.39 23.86
Proxy Fight 8.00 11.00 15.00 7.94 8.00 11.00 15.00 8.52 0.00 12.76
Total 8.00 10.00 16.00 8.27 9.00 11.00 18.00 9.11 2.94 19.70
Panel B: Propensity-Score Matched Ownership Analysis
Sample Success Failure Di¤erence Std Error T-Stat
Ownership, % Unmatched 9.36 7.90 1.46*** 0.47 3.11
Matched 9.36 8.38 0.98 0.64 1.52
Max. Ownership, % Unmatched 10.92 10.39 0.53 0.69 0.76
Matched 10.92 9.87 1.05 0.69 1.53
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Table 6: Characteristics of Target Companies
The table presents the characteristics of companies targeted in activist campaigns between 2000-2007
including 21 campaigns with no Schedule 13D ling (i.e., events below the 5% ling threshold).
Columns 6 and 7 report di¤erences between the average target and the average CRSP/Compustat rm
after propensity-score matching in terms of industry, size (market cap) and book-to-market ratio.
Market value is market capitalization in millions of dollars. Book-to-market is book value of equity to
market value of equity. Book leverage is debt divided by total assets. Q ratio is dened as market
equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment credit divided by assets.
ROA is operating income over total assets. Asset turnover is sales over total assets. Growth is sales
growth over the previous four quarters. R&D is research and development expense over assets.
Institutional data from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) and analyst data from I/B/E/S.
All variables are lagged by one quarter and winsorized at 1 percent. Stars denote usual signicance levels.
Summary Statistics Unmatched Di¤erence Matched Di¤erence
Characteristic Mean Median SD Avg Di¤ St Err Avg Di¤ St Err
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market value 868.52 155.22 2915.85 -68846.680 52435.810 -1741.92*** 254.296
Book-to-market 1.27 0.60 2.98 0.055 0.074 -0.031 0.089
Book leverage 0.23 0.19 0.23 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.047
Q-ratio 1.30 0.97 1.13 -0.413*** 0.025 -0.374*** 0.029
ROA 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Asset turnover 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.036*** 0.003 -0.003 0.004
Growth 0.10 0.03 0.43 -0.079*** 0.007 -0.065*** 0.009
Market share 0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.003** 0.002 0.001 0.002
R&D 0.28 0.00 1.92 -0.089*** 0.032 0.031 0.036
Inst Ownership 0.57 0.58 0.32 0.143*** 0.005 0.126*** 0.007
Analysts 8.28 6.00 7.19 -2.093*** 0.180 -0.355* 0.202
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Table 7: Costs of Commonly Used Activist Tactics
The table presents cost estimates for common activist tactics derived by a backward sequence of logistic
regressions. The sample includes public campaigns between 2000-2007 and 21 events with no Sch 13D
(i.e., below the 5% ling threshold). Right-censored observations whose outcome is unknown as of 2007
are excluded. Panel A reports avg. stage-specic costs with bias-corrected bootstrap condence intervals.
Scale refers to the stage-specic variance parameter used to estimate the cost thresholds. Percent classied
refers to the proportion of correctly classied campaign continuations. The reported R2 is McFaddens R2.
Panel B reports conditional logistic regressions with dependent variable equal to one if a hedge fund activist
continues a campaign to the next stage. Marked-to-market investment equals the activists current stake.
Expected gross return is the expected rm value after a successful campaign and is estimated by a censored
quantile regression of the rms Q ratio on the tercile ranks of rm characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered by activist campaign. Stars denote usual signicance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A: Stage-Specic Costs ($M)
Tactic Mean 95% Interval Scale R2 % Classied
Demand Negotiations $2.94M $0.89M $6.96M 3.68 17.90% 58.09%
Board Representation $1.83M $0.46M $4.32M 2.99 18.20% 60.69%
Proxy Contest $5.94M $3.04M $10.86M 1.15 20.40% 77.78%
Panel B: Stage-Specic Logistic Estimation
Coe¢ cient St. Error Obs
Demand Negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.809*** (0.671) 241
Expected gross return 0.271*** (0.103)
Board Representation Marked-to-market investment -2.389*** (0.792) 145
Expected gross return 0.334*** 0.122)
Proxy Contest Marked-to-market investment -3.287*** (0.951) 63
Expected gross return 0.869*** (0.225)
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Table 8: Activist Abnormal Return Analysis
The table reports statistics on the returns of hedge fund activist campaigns between 2000 and 2007
excluding campaigns with no specic activist demands. Returns are computed starting one month before
the activist event and ending with the last Schedule 13D ling or December 2007. DGTW returns refer to
characteristic-based returns. The last row reports total portfolio returns of the hedge funds with 13F data.
Panel A: Campaign Raw Returns
Deal Period Returns, % Annualized Returns, %
25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand Negotiations -7.36 18.96 75.10 30.85 68.15 -9.81 25.28 100.12 41.13 78.69
Board Representation 5.11 40.20 101.23 49.43 85.95 3.41 26.80 67.49 32.95 70.18
Proxy Contest 3.17 37.67 80.67 36.88 65.48 1.65 19.65 42.09 19.24 47.30
Total -1.03 32.63 90.70 39.35 74.34 -0.82 26.10 72.56 31.48 66.49
Panel B: Annualized Abnormal Returns
Value-Weighted Returns, % DGTW Returns, %
25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand Negotiations -21.72 4.88 33.56 8.28 57.54 -19.27 9.29 35.05 7.59 48.41
Board Representation -16.55 1.93 21.61 1.62 62.28 -8.85 6.35 23.94 6.82 47.94
Proxy Contest -13.99 6.35 20.01 3.01 42.52 -5.88 5.94 16.83 3.28 35.51
Total -16.06 3.89 25.14 4.02 54.10 -11.01 7.61 24.66 5.75 43.93
Panel C: Annualized Abnormal Net Returns
Value-Weighted Returns, % DGTW Returns, %
25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand Negotiations -31.68 2.33 37.32 0.39 74.94 -27.65 6.41 36.11 3.97 58.87
Board Representation -21.38 0.00 23.25 -1.47 67.80 -14.99 3.48 21.91 4.65 48.12
Proxy Contest -15.17 1.05 15.17 -2.56 46.53 -16.04 0.61 13.33 -1.89 37.68
Total -19.01 1.40 22.39 0.23 58.05 -16.59 3.85 21.66 2.38 45.60
Total 13F Returns 4.40 15.84 22.85 14.84 11.78 10.76 16.38 22.88 17.18 8.75
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Table 9: Stage-Specic Logistic Regressions: Alternative Estimation Methods
The table presents results of a backward sequence of logistic regressions used to estimate activist costs.
The independent variable is the activists continuation decision at each stage and the dependent variables
are the current value of the activists stake and the expected gross return from campaign continuation.
Panel A reports results where gross returns are estimated by a censored quantile regression of the rms
Q ratio on the tercile ranks of rm characteristics (sales, asset turnover, market share, growth and R&D).
Q ratio is dened as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment
credit divided by assets. Panel B estimates gross returns in terms of the best performing industry peer
in the same value tercile as the target (no rm characteristics except for industry a¢ liation are used).
St. errors are clustered by campaign. Stars denote signicance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel B: Estimation of Target Valuations (Firm Characteristics)
Coe¢ cient St. Error Obs
Demand Negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.809*** (0.671) 241
Expected gross return 0.271*** (0.103)
Board Representation Marked-to-market investment -2.389*** (0.792) 145
Expected gross return 0.334*** 0.122)
Proxy Contest Marked-to-market investment -3.287*** (0.951) 63
Expected gross return 0.869*** (0.225)
Panel B: Estimation of Target Valuations (Best Performing Industry Peer)
Coe¢ cient St.Error
Demand Negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.180*** (0.491) 242
Expected gross return 0.221** (0.113)
Board Representation Marked-to-market investment -1.989*** (0.563) 147
Expected gross return 0.329** (0.147)
Proxy Contest Marked-to-market investment -3.346*** (1.087) 63
Expected gross return 0.932*** (0.343)
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Table 10: Expected Activist Reward by Outcome
The table reports expected reward measures for activist campaigns between 2000-2007 including
21 (non-public) events with no Schedule 13D ling. Excluded are events with no specic activist
demands. The comparison between successful and failed campaigns is in terms of expected activist
reward, which is estimated by a censored quantile regression of the rms Q ratio on rm attributes.
Success Failure Di¤erence
Demand Negotiation 37.62 30.29 7.33
(10.21) (3.23) (10.71)
Board Representation 39.57 33.03 6.54
(4.92) (4.82) (6.89)
Proxy Fight 35.57 33.55 2.01
(5.17) (7.25) (8.90)
Total Sample (Matched) 36.47 32.18 4.29
(4.66)
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Table 11: Stage-Specic Logistic Regressions with Activist Fixed E¤ects
Results from stage-specic binary logistic regressions. Marked-to-market investment is the inverse of the
activists current stake; expected gross return equals the expected rm value if the campaign is successful
and is estimated by a censored quantile regression of the targets Q ratio on the tercile ranks of rm level
characteristics (sales, asset turnover, market share, growth and R&D ratio). Active HFs is an a 1/0 variable
for the 12 hedge funds with the most campaigns in 2000-07. Hostile HFs is a 1/0 variable for the 12 hedge
funds with the most proxy contests. Clustered standard errors. Stars denote signicance levels.
Coe¢ cient St. Error
Demand Negotiations Marked-to-market investment -3.034*** (0.808)
N=241 Expected gross return 0.639*** (0.179)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.451** (0.230)
Indicator: Active HFs -0.983** (0.442)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 1.267** (0.527)
Board Representation Marked-to-market investment -2.247*** (0.728)
N=145 Expected gross return 0.485*** (0.179)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.505*** (0.192)
Indicator: Active HFs 0.164 (0.537)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 1.109*** (0.425)
Proxy Contest Marked-to-market investment -3.916*** (1.428)
N=63 Expected gross return 1.141*** (0.422)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.399 (0.389)
Indicator: Active HFs -2.496** (1.149)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 2.688** (1.344)
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Table 12: Activist Abnormal Returns and Takeover Activity
The table reports statistics on the abnormal returns of hedge fund activist campaigns between 2000-2007
excluding campaigns with no specic hedge fund demands. The sample also includes 21 campaigns with
no Schedule 13D ling. Returns are computed starting one month before the campaign and ending with
the last Schedule 13D ling of the activist. Events with no exit are assumed to end in December 2007.
DGTW returns are characteristic-based returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
Panel A reports abnormal returns before activist costs while Panel B reports net returns after costs.
Matched results use propensity score matching in terms of the outcome (success/failure) of each campaign.
Panel A: Annualized Abnormal Returns by M&A Activity
Sample M&A No M&A Di¤erence Std Error T-Stat
Value-Weighted Returns, % Unmatched 26.80 0.03 26.77*** 5.95 4.50
Matched 26.80 15.75 11.05 8.13 1.36
DGTW Returns, % Unmatched 17.75 3.92 13.83*** 4.64 2.98
Matched 17.75 11.72 6.03 8.04 0.75
Panel A: Annualized Abnormal Net Returns by M&A Activity
Sample M&A No M&A Di¤erence Std Error T-Stat
Value-Weighted Net Returns, % Unmatched 22.58 -3.55 26.13*** 5.98 4.37
Matched 22.58 12.11 10.47 8.51 1.23
DGTW Net Returns, % Unmatched 14.88 0.30 14.58*** 5.03 2.89
Matched 14.88 11.86 3.02 8.62 0.35
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